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The Canadian ImmigrationAct states that one of its ob-jectives is to fulfill Canada'sinternational legal obliga-
tions to refugees and to uphold its hu-
manitarian tradition with respect to
the displaced and the persecuted.
Canada's tradition here has not been
solely humanitarian. At times it has
been downright inhumane. The Act
deliberately does not ask immigra-
tion policy makers to uphold the
whole of Canadian tradition regard-
ingthe displaced and persecuted, but
only the humanitarian component of
that tradition.
Thisobjectiveisnoteworthynotonly
because it singles out the humanitar-
ian componentof the Canadian tradi-
tion, but also because it distinguishes
between Canada's intemationallegal
obligation to refugees and that hu-
manitarian tradition. Fulfilling refu-
gee obligations and upholding the
humanitarian tradition are not one
and the same objective.
The very mention ofboth is an indi-
cation that Parliament believed what
is aIl too obvious, that the refugee def-
initiondoesnotcoyerevery displaced
and persecuted person who, for
humanitarian reasons, needs protec-
tion. The Immigration Act, at least in
its objectives, is generous, stretching
Canadian hands out beyond Conven-
tion refugees to the displaced and
persecuted who may not fall within
the refugee definition, but who still
justify humanitarian concerne
Mechanically, the Immigration Act
provides for the realization of this ob-
jective by stating any Convention
refugee and any person who is a
member of a designated class may be
granted admission ta Canada as per-
manent residents. There have been
four designated classes: the Latin
American Designated Class, later
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replaced by the Political Prisonersand
Oppressed Prisoners Class; the Self-
Exiled Class; and the Indochinese
Designated Class.
Admission of Convention refugees
and designated classes from abroad is
done through either private or gov-
ernment sponsorship. Refugees and
designated class members coming to
Canada must show they are likely to
establish successfully in Canada. Pri-
vate sponsorship, done by a corpora-
tiOtl, or five or more individuals, al-
lows arefugee to show likelihood of
successful establishment.
The GovernmentofCanadahas pro-
mulgated regulations which say that
a Canadian organization or group of
five individuals can sponsor a person
from designated countries in Indo-
china to come to Canada. The regula-
tians have been passed under the
legislative power to designate classes.
The admission of designated classes
is in accordance with Canada's hu-
manitarian tradition with respect to
the displaced and the persecuted.
V ntil September 1990 the countries
designated were Cambodia, Laosand
Vietnam. According to the regula-
tions, a person from but residing out-
side these countries could come to
Canada, as long as the person had a
sponsor here. The Government of
Canada also sponsored people from
this class to come to Canada under the
Govemment Refugee Allocation for
South East Asia.
For individuals, there was no need
to prove they were refugees. They did
not have to prove a well-founded fear
of persecution. Dislocation and spon-
sorship had been, in most cases,
enough.
Technically, there were two hurdles
for an applicant to jump. Applicants
had to show that they would success-
fully establishin Canada;and second,
Refuge
that theywould meet therequirements
of the Immigration Act and regula-
tions.
What the second hurdle means is
that applicants must not be in a pro-
hibited class. They must not have a
communicable disease, nor an illness
that would be costly to treat. An ap-
plicant must not have a serious crimi-
nalrecord.
For the purpose ofsuccessful estab-
lishment, a visa officer is supposed to
look not only at whether there is a
sponsorship, butalso at the points
system, and other financial assistance
available to the applicant. In theory, a
person who was a totalloss under the
points system could be rejected even
though there was a sponsor. In prac-
tice, most sponsored people are con-
sidered likely toestablishsuccessfully.
The Indochinese designated class
has been one of the most successful
programs the Immigration Depart-
ment has ever run. The class began 7
December 1978. At least in theory, it
remained in effect for Vietnam, Laos
and Cambodia till 1 September 1990.
Most of the large numbers of Viet-
namese who came ta Canadacameby
virtue of this class.
1say it remained in effect in theory
till September 1990 because in fact it
was no longer being operated after 14
June 1989 for Vietnamese and Lao-
tians arriving in Hong Kong after 16
June 1988 or in any other Southeast
Asian country after March 14, 1989.
While keeping the program on the
books as a regulation, the Govern-
ment ceased ta operate it administra-
tively for new arrivaIs.
The Vnited Nations (V.N.) held an
International Conference on Indochi-
nese refugees in Geneva, Switzerland
on June 13 and 14, 1989. Prior to the
Geneva Conference, the V.N. held a
preparatory meeting in Kuala Lum-
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pur, Malaysia on 8 March 1989. The
Malaysian meeting proposed a draft
declaration and comprehensive plan
ofactiononIndochineserefugees. The
Geneva meeting accepted the draft.
According to the plan, resettlement
of refugees from Indochina would
cease, except for those who passed
screeningprocedures. Thedeclaration
thataccompanied the plan stated that
governments were preoccupied with
theburden imposed on neighbouring
territories by asylum seekers. The
declaration also stated that govern-
ments were alarmed current arrange-
ments to deal with asylum seekers
might no longer be responsive to the
size of the problem.
Theplanitselfhad three keycompo-
nents: the establishment of screening
procedures, repatriationof those who
fail screening, and resettlement of
those who pass screening. Early es-
tablishmentofconsistentregion-wide
refugee status determination proc-
esses is required under the plan.
According to the plan, the status of
asylum seekers must be determined
by a quaUfied national authority, in
accordance with established refugee
criteria and procedures. The criteria
recognized are not restricted to the
1951 Convention. The Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights and other
relevant international instrumentsare
to be borne in mind and applied in a
humanitarian spirit. The UNHCR
Handbook on Procedures and Crite-
ria for Determining Refugee Status is
to serve as an authoritative and inter-
pretative guide and there is to be a
rightofappeal, with the asylumseeker
entitled to advice on appeal. The
UNHCR is to ensure proper and con-
sistent functioning of the procedures
and application of the criteria.
The plan goesonto say thatpersons
determined not to be refugees should
retum to their country of origin. Re-
settlement is divided into two cate-
gories - one for long stayers, and the
other for newly determined refugees.
Long stayersare a11 those who arrived
before a eut-off date (the date screen-
ing was established). For Hong Kong
the date is 16 June 1988. Long stayers
are eligibl~ for resettlement without
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going through screening.
For those who arrived after the cut-
offdate, only those whopassed screen-
ing are eligible for resettlement. The
plan says a resettlementprogram will
accommodate aIl those who arrive af-
ter the introduction of status determi-
nationproceduresand aredetermined
to be refugees.
The Chair of the Geneva Confer-
ence that adopted the plan in June
1989, Dato Haji Abu Hassan Bin Haji
Omarof Malaysia, in hisclosingstate-
ment, indicated that the plan's pur-
pose was ta discourage Vietnamese
from leaving Vietnam. He said "asy-
lum seekers could no longer assume
that they would be automatically
regarded as refugees and therefore
entitled ta automatic resettlement."
There are three problems with the
structure 1have just mentioned. One
is that it had no reflection in Canadian
law for over a year. The second is that
it is an abdication of Canadian sover-
eignty. The third is the inadequacy of
Hong Kong screening.
Between 14 June 1989 and Septem-
ber 1990, Canadian law did not say
screening was necessary ta come
within the Indochinese designated
class. Canadian policy was, however,
that screening in the country of tem-
poraryasylum was necessary to come
within the class.
The policy was retroactive. It was
adopted 14June 1989, thedateofadop-
tion of the U.N. Comprehensive Plan.
But it was retroactive to 16 June 1988,
the date of introduction ofHong Kong
screening. A person who arrived in
Hong Kongbetween 16June 1988and
14 June 1989 and failed screening,
would be ineligible for resettlement
inCanada under the Indochinese des-
ignated class. This was the case even
though the law said nothing about it,
and the asylum seeker wouId have
known nothing about the 16June 1988
eut-off. The purpose of the plan is to
discourage people from leaving Viet-
nam. Those who left before the plan
was accepted could hardly have been
discouraged by the plan, even if they
were susceptible to discouragement.
Yet tlle plan applied to them.
Canadiancompliancewith the plan
Refuge
was a violation of Canadian law. As
long as the designation of Vietnam as
part of the Indochinese designated
class was on thebooks, ithad to be op-
erated according to its terms. There
was a legitimate expectation in both
sponsorsandapplicantsthatthespon-
sor system would work.
Even if one accepts as valid the
premise that it is necessary to have a
screening system to discourage Viet-
namese who are not refugees from
fleeing Vietnam, that purpose was ill
servedbytheCanadiansysteminexis-
tence from June 1989 to September
1990. The Indochinese designated
class served as a lure that became a
trap. Canadianlawheld outtheprom-
ise that Vietnamese might qualify for
resettlement as long as they left Viet-
nam. It was only after they left Viet-
nam and arrived in the camps that
they found the Canadian law was not
beingoperated according to its terms.
The comprehensive plan has led to
forced repatriation to Hong Kong. Just
before Christmas 1989, fifty-one boat
people who had failed screeningwere
taken from the Hong Kong camps
and deported to Vietnam. The United
Nations High Commission for Refu-
gees, in a note to the Hong Kong
Govemment, said ithad notbeenable
to verify whether thosebeingretumed
were real refugees or not. The Gov-
ernmentofCanadaopposed the repa-
triation of these people, saying it pro-
foundly regretted the decision. Yet
the Government of Canada was part
of the Comprehensive Plan, which
agreed to forced repatriation. By re-
fusing resettlement, even where there
were sponsors and the law allowed
for resettlement, the Canadian Gov-
ernment helped to make forced repa-
triation inevitable.
The second problem1have with the
changeisitsabdicationofsovereignty.
In principle there is nothing wrong
with requiring a person to pass
through screening before he or she
cames to Canada as a refugee. On the
contrary, it may be preferable to the
system as it was before 14 June 1989.
Bringing asylum seekers over to
Canada without screening gives an
advantage to some asylum seekers
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over others. Refugee claimants from
everywhere else in the world have to
prove they are refugees to receive
protection in Canada. It is unfair to
refugee claimants elsewhere in the
world to require them to pass screen-
ing and yet not require it of Indochi-
nese.
The Indochinese waiver of screen-
ing continues to operate for Cambo-
dians, for pre-June 16, 1988 arrivaIs to
Hong Kong, and elsewhere in South
East Asia for pre-March 14, 1989 ar-
rivaIs. But for many Indochinese, the
Canadianwaiverofscreeningisgone.
So screening, in itself, makes sense,
but only if it is Canadian screening.
The Government of Canada cannot
delegate a foreign government to
performany legal function. Screening
that is relevant to Canadian admis-
sion has to be subject to the supervi-
sion of the Canadian courts. Yet how
can the Canadian courts supervise a
foreign administrative and legal sys-
tem?
For someone to qualify for admis-
sion to Canada, what should be im-
portant is not whether the person
passed foreignscreening, butwhether
the person is a refugee. The only way
the Government of Canada, and the
Canadian legal system can satisfy
themselves that the person is a refu-
gee is if the decision is a Canadian
decision.
Technically what is happening is
that the Hong Kong authorities deny
Canadian visa officers access to Viet-
namese who have not been screened
or who have failed screening. Cana-
dian visa officers are allowed access
only to those Vietnamese in Hong
Kong who pass screening.
ln principlethosepost-June 16,1988
arrivaIs who pass Hong Kong screen-
ing must still pass Canadian screen-
ing. But Canada has agreed, as part of
the Comprehensive Planof Action, to
be involved ina resettlementprogram
to accommodate aIl those who arrive
after 16June 1988and passHongKong
screening. For Canada to refuse reset-
tlementon the basis of its own screen-
ing after a person has passed Hong
Kong screening would be a violation
of the Comprehensive Plan.
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The abdication of sovereignty does
not appear in the regulations. The
regulations do not specifically defer
to Hong Kong screening. If one were
to look at the regulations alone, the
ability of Canada to screen refugee
applicants would appear intact. It is
only the regulations read in conjunc-
tion with the Comprehensive Plan of
Action that show this abdication.
The denial of access by Hong Kong
authorities to those who fail screen-
ing or have yet to be screened is not
unilateral. It is also inherent in the
ComprehensivePlanofAction, which
Canada has signed. In effect, Canada
has agreed not to seek access to a
person unless the person passes
screening.
Canadian officiaIs claim they have
notabdicated screening to Hong Kong
officiaIs. AlI that has happened, they
say, is they cannot get access to Viet-
namese in Hong Kong until the Viet-
namese pass screening.This claim is a
formalisme Canadianscannotgetand
do not seek access because they have
agreed not to seek access.
The Canadian government's justi-
fication for this scheme is that it is
better than what would exist without
the Comprehensive Plan of Action.
Without the Comprehensive Plan,
they say, Hong Kong would forcibly
repatriate aIl Vietnamese. With the
Comprehensive Plan at least sorne,
those who pass screening, avoid
forced repatriation.
Refuge
The value of thatargumentdepends
on the value ofHong Kong screening.
If Hong Kong screening is leading
either to the forced repatriationof real
refugees, or to the establishment of
deterrence and disincentives that ei-
ther prevent real refugees from com-
ingorencouragethosewhohavecome
to return, then the argument has no
merit. Intemationallaw requires pro-
tection of aIl refugees, not just sorne
refugees. A law that protects only
sorne is a bad law. The argument that
such a law is better than no law at aIl
is a political argument, not one of
principle.
If Hong Kong screening is rejecting
and deterring real refugees, and there
is every reason to believe that it is,
then the Comprehensive Plan of Ac-
tion trades off the protection of sorne
refugees against others. Those who
pass Hong Kong screening are re-
settled. Those who fail are abandoned.
That sort of trade off is legally and
morally indefensible.
Canadianabdicationofsovereignty
might, in certain circumstances, itself
be acceptable. The circumstances
would be ones where the foreign
screening system was fair beyond a
shadow of a doubt. Then Canada
could accept the resultswithout
qualms. Yet the Hong Kong system is
anything but fair. The Hong Kong
screening system is similar to the old
Canadian system. A claimant is inter-
viewedbyan immigrationofficer. The
officer either decides, if he or she
concludes the case is simple, or rec-
ommends, ifthecaseisdifficult. Where
the officer decides, a Senior Immigra-
tion Officer reviews the decision,
based on theofficer's interview notes.
Where the officer recommends, the
Senior Immigration Officer decides,
againbasedon the officer'snotes. That
decision is subject to review by the
Chief Immigration Officer.
A negative decision at the first level
is subject to review by a second level
Refugee Status Review Board. The re-
view is a paper screening, based on
the interview notes, a written assess-
ment of the case by the deciding offi-
cer, and any representation theclaim-
ant may wish to make.
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There is no access to the HongKong
courts toappeal a negative decisionof
the Review Board. Hong Kong law
says a decision of the Board shall not
be subject to review or appeal in any
court.This process presents a number
of problems. One is absence of coun-
sel. Counsel are not allowed to be
present either for the initial interview
with the investigating officer nor for
thedeliberations ofthe Review Board.
AlI that counsel can do, under the
currentsystem, is help prepare claim-
ants for their interviews with immi-
gration officers, and help in filing
written appeals to the Review Board.
Even those tasks, while in principle
permissible, are inordinatelydifficult.
Simply getting access to the claim-
ants, whoarekeptincloseddetention
camps, is a problem. Counsel are ei-
ther denied access to the camps or
required to go through an elaborate
bureaucratic procedure to gain access.
Claimants are given little, if any,
notice of the dates of their immigra-
tion interviews. The Immigration
Department of Hong Kong will not
advise counsel when claimants will
be interviewed or even whether they
have been interviewed.
At the review stage there is provi-
sion for legal representation. Legal
representation maybeeither a lawyer
entitled to practice in Hong Kong or
an appeals counsellor engaged by the
Agency for Voluntary Service. The
AgencyforVoluntaryServiceisabody
funded by the United Nations High
Commission for Refugees.
As of December 1989, the Agency
for VoluntaryServicehad only twelve
legal advisers. Yet the Hong Kong
system was generating 180 refusaIs a
week. The twelve advisers have been
able to take up and act on only eight-
een cases a week. The rest, by and
large, go unrepresented.
There is an urgent need for lawyers
to assist claimants going through
HongKongscreening. There are many
Canadian lawyers who go to Hong
Kong to assist in the preparation of
entrepreneur applications. These
lawyersshouldconsiderwhether they
can also assist, while they are there,
Vietnamese asylum members.








That assistance would be particu-
larly appropriate where there are
Canadians seeking to sponsor Viet-
namese in Hong Kong. There is an ac-
tive institutionalized sponsorship
system throughout Canada for Viet-
namese refugees. The sponsors are
being frustrated by the Canadian ac-
ceptance of the Comprehensive Plan
and Hong Kong screening. 1 expect
Canadian institutional sponsors, who
are often intermediaries for Vietnam-
ese in Canada seeking to bring their
felativesover, would weIcome Cana-
dian legal assistance.
A Canadian lawyer in Hong Kong
can be eligible to help a Vietnamese
asylum member by qualifying for the
Hong Kong bar or by coming under
the umbrella of the Agency for Volun-
tary Service. In practice, neither of
these steps may be necessary.
No qualification is necessary to
assist a claimant to prepare for his
initial interview, since Hong Kong
law does not contemplate legal assis-
tance. The obstacles are one of a prac-
tical nature - getting access to the
claimant and finding out when the
interview is.
Even for the appeal, since there is
no oral hearing, being qualified may
not be crucial. Representation can go
in under the name of the claimant
rather than under the name of the
lawyer if the lawyer has neither the
blessingof the Hong Kong bar nor the
~gency for Voluntary Service.
Refuge
Thoughappearancesathearingsare
impossible, lobbying those who de-
cide is possible. Immigration officers
who interview, Senior Immigration
Officers who review and even Re-
view Board Members who consider
appeals will hear representations
made on behalf of claimants outside
the formaI screening.
The Comprehensive Plan provides
that the UNHCR shall advise in writ-
ing each individual of the nature of
the procedure, the implications for
rejected cases, and the right of appeal.
ln fact, that does not happen. Am-
nesty International reports thatclaim-
ants know little or nothing about the
procedure before they are subjected
to interviews. There is no written in-
formation circulated to claimants.
Claimants go into interviews unpre-




fied and competentnational authority
in accordance with established refu-
geecriteriaand procedure. Again that
does not happen. Those interviewing
and deciding are neitherqualified nor
competent.
There is no qualification required
for an immigration officer to decide
refugee claims. There is no test of
competency imposed. Refugee crite-
ria are routinely misapplied or ig-
nored. Establishedrefugeeprocedures
are flouted.
Observers note that interviewing
officers show little or no knowledge
of human rights violations in Viet-
nam, though that is the only country
with which they are dealing. They do
not allow claimants to tell their sto-
ries, but instead ask leading, hostile
questions, and cutclaimantsoffin the
midst of their answers. Officers bring
a prior skepticism to the hearings,
believing claimants are economic mi-
grants rather than refugees. They
show little familiarity with the refu-
gee definition. In several cases where
claimants told stories that brought
them clearly within the refugee de-
finition, the claimants were refused
aIl the same. Claimants are supposed
to be given the benefit of the doubt.
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But instead they are systematically
denied it. Translation is often sloppy,
misleading, confusing and inad-
equate.
When a claimant is refused, he or
she is not given reasons, neither at the
level of the Immigration Department,
nor at the level of the Review Board.
Claimantshavenoopportunitytohear
what the possible objections to their
claims are, or of contesting those ob-
jections.
Only 3percentof those interviewed
by immigration officers are accepted
as refugees. A further 7.4 percent of
those who appeal are successful. The
fact that twice as many succeed on
appeal as do at the first interview is
itself an indicator that the first hear-
ing is not properly functioning. Nor-
mally an appeal court increases the
success rate by only a fraction above
the rate of increase at the first level.
The negative nature of the first level
hearing taints the possibility of later
success. A claimant denied at the first
level has not only a negative decision
to reverse, there is also a negative rec-
ord. The interviewing officer's notes
and assessment, which form part of
the record before the Review Board,
maybeatvariancewith theclaimant's
story through his or her own repre-
sentations to the board. This variance
may not be the fault of the claimant,
but simply the consequence of a
botched hearing conducted by an
immigration officer who either can-
not or does not want to understand
the claimant's story.
The VNHCR offers a safety valve to
the system. If someone is rejected at
both levels, and the UNHCRnonethe-
less believes the person is a refugee,
the UNHCR can recognize the person
as a refugee falling within its man-
date. The VNHCR has obtained an
agreement from the Hong Kong
Government that such mandate refu-
gees will not be forcibly repatriated.
This safety net, while valuable, is
not in itself an answer to aIl the prob-
lems of Hong Kong screening. Be-
cause the Review Board gives no rea-
sons for its decisions and the VNHCR
is not allowed to attend Review Board
sessions, itis difficult for the VNHCR
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to make refugee determinations aside
from setting up its own procedure.
Yet virtually aIl its processing re-
sources are devoted to helping claim-
ants through the Hong Kong system.
Theimplementationof the Compre-
hensive Plan, including forced repa-
triation, was left to a steering commit-
tee of which Canada is a member. But
that steering committee has not been
able to agree on the terms for forced
repatriation.
Vietnam decided to accept the fifty-
one people the British wished to de-
port before Christmas 1989. But the
international outcry the repatriation
aroused led Vietnam to hesitate about
accepting others forced toreturn with-
out international agreement in ad-
vance.
An attempt to get international
agreement on forced representations
to Vietnam has failed. There was a
meeting in Geneva of thirty different
countries, onJanuary 23 and 24 of this
year, to attempt to reach agreement.
The V.S. refused to agree to forced
repatriation to Vietnam from Hong
Kong unless screening procedures
were improved.
Hong Kong is a colony of the V.K.
It's screening procedures were estab-
lished by the V.K. Government. The
problem in reaching international
agreementisadifficultywith theV.K.
Government, notwith the Hong Kong
Government. The UNHCR has told
the V.K. it must introduce new safe-
guardsinto screeningbefore the V.N.
will endorse an international agree-
menton forced repatriation. TheV.K.
is attempting to go ahead with forced
repatriation without V.N. approval.
It is entering into direct negotiations
withtheVietnameseGovernment. The
British Government is offering Viet-
nam an undisclosed sum of money as
an incentive to accept those returned
unwillingly from Hong Kong.
It is understandable that the Gov-
ernmentofEngland would opposean
improvement in the Hong Kong
screening system, seeing it is so simi-
lar to its own.
The V.K. system, for asylum seek-
ers who arrive without documenta-
tionat aV.K. airor sea port, is cursory.
Refuge
A person is interviewed by a Home
Office official. -A transcript is sent to a
Refugee Vnitin the Department. The
unit reads the transcript and decides.
If the decision is negative, the person
must leave. There is a right of appeal,
but only after the claimant has left the
country and been forcibly returned to
the country of danger fled.
At the interview where the claim is
made, counsel may attend, but is not
allowed to participate. Counsel can
ask the interviewer to put specifie
questions to the claimant but can ask
no questions of the claimant him or
herself.
Those who interview are neither
specialized, nor qualified for refugee
examinations. According to observ-
ers and commentators, officiaIsbring
a skeptical and enforcement-minded
attitude to refugee claims. Sorne offi-
cers make gratuitously offensive or
sarcastic remarks. Even the well-in-
tentioned fail to ask appropriate ques-
tions because of their lack of experi-
ence in refugee matters and lack of
information about the country fled.
The Refugee Vnit that decides, be-
cause it is part of the government, is
politicized. It relies heavily on For-
eign Office information which con-
demnsgovernmentshostile to theV.K.
aspersecutorsand refuses tocondemn
governments friendly to the V.K.
In addition to the right of appeal af-
ter removal, the V.K. system allows
for judicial review. But review is only
for an arguable error of law. It is not
available to correct a negative deci-
sion factually mistaken.
When the V.S. objected to the Hong
Kong screening procedure, the Brit-
ishaccused theV.S. ofhypocrisy. Mar-
garet Thatcher, in a meeting with
George Bush, pointed to the V.S. pol-
icy of intercepting boats filled with
Haitian asylum seekers and sending
them back to Haiti. The point Marga-
ret Thatcher made is a valid one, and
applies to more than just interdiction
by the V.S. The V.S. process suffers
from many of the same problems as
the Hong Kong system.1havealready
outlined V.S. refugee determination
problems in my book The Sanctuary
Trial, so 1 hesitate to summarize the
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problems here. The grotesque results
of the D.S. system, with a 97 percent
rejection rate for Salvadoran and
Guatemalan refugee claimants, speak
for themselves.
Nocountryhasa refugeedetermina-
tion process free of aIl the faults of the
Hong Kong system, which may be a
caricature of the worst faults of West-
ern screening systems. In another
book, co-authored with Ilana Simon,
titled Closing the Doors: The Failure of
Refugee Protection, 1wrote,
If the South East Asian first asylum
countries were simply to send refugees
back without screening, the West 'lvould
object and press for change. When coun-
tries like Hong Kong reject refugees by
mimicking the procedures the West has
used, the West is in no position to com-
plain. We are seeing not so much acrude
and indiscriminate rejection of aIl refu-
gees, but rather a sophisticated simula-
tion in first asylum countries of the tech-
niques developed in Western resettlement
countries.
The Canadian system, particularly
at the second level, offers a better
hearing than is offered inHong Kong.
There are elements of the Canadian
system one can point to with pride.
But when the system as a whole pres-
ents sucha mixed bag ofelements, the
Canadian Government will seem as
hypocritical as the American if it
presses for an improvement in Hong
Kong screening.
ln Canada, the burdenofproof is on
the claimant, as in Hong Kong. There
are no standardized requirements for
interpreters, as in Hong Kong. At the
Canadian entry-Ievel hearing, one of
the two people deciding, and the one
presiding, isan immigrationadjudica-
tor, a person who is neither by func-
tion nor training qualified or compe-
tent in refugee matters. The adjudica-
tor poses many of the same problems
to a refugee claimant that a Hong
Kongimmigrationofficerdoes. There
is, on the other hand, a refugee board
member present who call decide in
favour of the claimant and, in effect,
overrule the adjudicator on the deci-
sionwhether theclaimantshould pass
the first level.
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The claimant in Canada has a right
to assistance ofcounsel, whicha Hong
Kong claimant does not. On tlle other
hand, the Canadian hearing is an ad-
versarial one, with a government
representativepresent to contest, cross
examineandcontradict. AHongKong
hearing may be adversarial in fact,
dependingon the hearing,but it is not
structured that way.
There is no meaningful appeal from
a negative decision in Canada made
atafirstlevelhearing. The HongKong
appeal is a faulty one, but at least a
persan stays in the countryuntil his or
her appeal is heard, which does not
happen in Canada.
Canada has not, like the D.S., pro-
posed an improvement in HongKong
screening. Instead it proposed a year-
long delay in mandatory repatriation
ofVietnamese already in HongKong,
but prompt return for those who ar-
rive now. Tlle British rejected this
proposaI.
There are two contrasts that must
be kept in mind when looking at the
plight of Vietnamese refugee claim-
ants in Hong Kong. One is the con-
trastbetween theCanadian treatment
of Vietnamese refugee claimants in
Hong Kong and of entrepreneurial
and investor applicants from Hong
Kong. The other is the contrast be-
tween the treatmentHong Kong gives
to the Vietnamese refugees and the
treatment Hong Kong residents are
asking for themselves asa resultof the
impending takeover by China.
TherecentNational FilmBoard pro-
duction "Who Gets ln" showed gra-
phically thecontrastbetweenthe treat-
ment the Canadian visa office inHong
Kong gives to entrepreneurial and in-
vestor applicantson theonehand and
refugee claimants on the other. En-
trepreneurial and investor applicants
are welcomed with open a~ms.Refu-
gee claimants are allowed in be-
grudgingly, if at aIl.
1do not raise this contrast to ques-
tion the entrepreneurial and investor
programs, which 1 believe do have
their place in Canadian immigration
policy. But 1point out that in the long
run it is impossible to run a generous
entrepreneurial programand a restric-
Refuge
tive refugee program side by side. At
sorne point, the restrictiveness of the
refugee program will undercut the
support for the entrepreneurial pro-
gram. To a certain extent, that under-
cutting of support is already happen-
ing. Those who believe in welcoming
entrepreneurs, if they want to main-
tain that welcome, must work to en-
sure that refugees are equally wel-
come.
China will assume control of Hong
Kong in 1997. Chinese repression and
the 1989TiananmenSquareMassacre
have caused people of Hong Kong
seriousconcernaboutwhat freedoms
they will be allowed after 1997. In-
deed, muchof the entrepreneurial and
investor movement from Hong Kong
is an anticipatory refugee movement
of people leaving in advance of the
impending Chinese takeover.
Yet, the people of Hong Kong will
have difficulty generating sympathy
from the rest of the world for the im-
pending takeover and repression by
China, when the Hong Kong Govern-
ment is treating Vietnamese refugees
in Hong Kong so badly. Again, 1 do
notadvocate that we ignore theplight
of potential Hong Kong refugees
because the Hong Kong govemment
is slighting the tragedyofVietnamese
refugees. But 1think it is worth point-
ing out that Hong Kong is undercut-
ting the support it may hope to fetch
for its own potential problems.
For Canada, 1suggest the way to re-
form the HongKongsystemisthrough
improvement in the Canadian refu-
gee determinationsystem. Onlywhen
Margaret Thatcher and others cannot
accuse Canada of being hypocritical
is the GovemmentofCanada going to
be credible in arguingagainst forcible
repatriation of refugees from Hong
Kong to Vietnam. In the meantime,
individuals, lawyers and organiza-
tions in Canada must do what they
can to assist those caught up in the
Hong Kong detention camps.
David Matas is Chair of the Working
Group On Overseas Protection of the
Canadian Council for Refugees.
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